Academic Freedom or Something Else?

A tenured full professor refuses to add a key program assessment to her course. An associate professor stands in the way of a program going on-line because he refuses to teach his course on-line and refuses to let anyone else teach the course. The faculty senate executive committee pushes back on policy changes proposed by administration. The university curriculum committee challenges course proposals that seem to be influenced by administration. These and similar actions occur across universities – and often in the name of academic freedom. But to what degree are these instances really academic freedom? What happens when faculty – individually or collectively – justify behaviors according to an over-generalized image of academic freedom? How do we decide when something is truly a matter of academic freedom?

Questioning what constitutes academic freedom in no way challenges its value. Hopefully, it achieves the opposite – by having a clearer definition of academic freedom, we are in a stronger position to protect it. In today’s context, this is vital because academic freedom is under attack in a number of ways. As Giroux notes:

While the universities are increasingly corporatized and militarized, their governing structures are becoming more authoritarian, faculty are being devalued as public intellectuals, students are viewed as clients, academic fields are treated as economic domains for providing credentials and work place skills, and academic freedom is under assault.

To tease out issues regarding academic freedom, I’ve turned to Dewey’s essay, “Philosophies of Freedom.” In this essay, he follows his often-used pattern of analysis where he first identifies different views/philosophies regarding the subject, identifies weaknesses with those positions, and then offers his own philosophy in response. He identifies the first two philosophies of freedom as ideas stemming from freedom of choice and freedom as the power to act. He then then offers his position that freedom as effective reason. His argument provides great fodder when considering academic freedom.

Academic Freedom vs. Academic Anarchy

The first philosophy of freedom Dewey addresses is the freedom of choice. According to Dewey, this image of freedom is predicated upon the assumption that individuals are endowed with freedom prior to actions. In higher education, this endowment, in the minds of some, is bestowed at the point in which an individual earns tenure (or, perhaps, when one receives a tenure-track contract, but without tenure, there are risks involved in exercising one’s “freedoms”).

We’ve all known faculty members who champion this image of freedom – freedom to say no to committee work, freedom to demand that courses be offered on particular days and particular times, freedom to continue to teach a course the way the course has always been taught, etc. Faculty who use this image of academic freedom often see themselves as apart from (often above) others and the institution in general. They argue that no administrator can tell them what to do.

Dewey challenges this notion of freedom because all choices have consequences – liabilities that limit the full range of choices. One is free to choose only insofar as he or she is willing to experience the consequences of those choices. Refusing to add a key assessment to a class potentially compromises accreditation. Refusing to allow a course to be taught online compromises potential enrollment and revenue. Refusing to change when a course is taught may impact whether students can complete their programs. Refusing to serve on a committee puts even more work on colleagues who may not be able to say “no” quite so easily.

We’ve all known faculty members who were indulged and allowed to say no. Administrators felt powerless to do anything with them, so the faculty members were allowed to dictate their schedules, teach courses however they wanted to, and/or continue to refuse service while others continued to do more. This is not academic freedom. At best, it is indulged anarchy. The problem with this is that we are all connected. As Dewey notes, “A being connected with other beings cannot perform his own activities without taking the activities of others into account. For they are the indispensable conditions of the realization of his tendencies” (p. 16). We have to acknowledge that the choices we make impact those around us, and when we refuse to address the faculty member who preserves his or her “academic freedom” at the expense of others, then we compromise the overall democratic nature of our institution. It cannot thrive when we create conditions through which a very privileged few have the preordained power to control the quality of life of others as well as the status of academic programs.

Academic Freedom vs. Academic Privilege

The second philosophy of freedom that Dewey critiques is the freedom as power to act. Like the first philosophy of freedom, this freedom is also endowed prior to choices being made. It is a collection of rights afforded to a specific group with the expectation that they will use that power to ensure progress. Dewey associates this philosophy of freedom with Liberalism in the late 1920s. For this image of freedom to thrive, governing bodies need to stay out of the way. This philosophy of freedom can be seen in universities as faculty senate groups and unions attempt to exert influence over administrative decisions.

This image of freedom is immediately at odds with the many layers of governance that influence academic decisions: federal regulations, state policies, boards of trustees, and executive leadership within each institution. In addition, while it has no governing authority, the market itself influences decisions in universities as competition increases. The faculty governing unit is one of many that must understand the complex nature all of these factors that influence decisions in higher education.

Dewey argues that it is not enough for administration to stay out of the way. He contends that each action is “immediately caught in an infinite and intricate network of interactions” (p. 273). Without understanding the implications of the context and connections, freedom to act does not guarantee good and just actions. Given the siloed nature of higher education, it is difficult for any governing body representing faculty to fully understand the implications of administrative decisions.

This is not to say that faculty governance is not essential for the well-being of universities. It is vital. Faculty are the keepers of the curriculum – which includes the larger aims of the institution. As one full professor said to an incoming president at one university where I served, “You all come and go. We stay. We will be here long after you are gone.” You cannot put the full power of decision making into the hands of transient leaders who are often building their vitas for professional advancement. The same can be said of public schools and churches – the institutions will suffer as a result.

However, it is important to note that when a select few have been given the power of decision making and are expected to represent others, there is no guarantee that the others will be represented well. Tenured faculty are able to maintain certain privileges because there are others who do not hold the same level of privilege: the non-tenure track faculty, the adjuncts, and the staff. By virtue of power to choose and responsibility to represent others, faculty governance does not always and necessarily uphold the image of common good Dewey described:

The desired transformation is not difficult to define in a formal way. It signifies a society in which every person shall be occupied in something which makes the lives of others better worth living, and which accordingly makes the ties which bind persons together more perceptible – which breaks down the barriers of distance between them. (p. 326)

University politics and self-preservation of programs often get in the way of the institutional common good. With this in mind, is it really academic freedom if it is achieved through the subjugation of others?

Academic Freedom as a Collective and Ongoing Achievement

Throughout Dewey’s writings, he notes two critical points: context and connectedness matter. First, we cannot attempt to define any idea that impacts our work together without simultaneously considering the conditions under which that idea functions. Second, nothing happens in isolation. We are always part of a community, and the community shapes what we know and who we are. Further, Dewey argues time and time again against the a priori. He notes, “We are free not because of what we statically are, but in as far as we are becoming different than what we have been” (p. 280). Freedom is not some absolute true state existing outside of ourselves. It is not, in his words, “an original possession” (p.275). Instead, it is a “growth, an attainment,” (p. 275) achieved through the work of a community of reasonable beings who are bound together by common aims. It is when individuals working together make choices that create more opportunities for growth and that lead to thoughtful consideration of consequences as more choices are made. It requires a conscious holding back from personal desires in order to support a common good.

Given this philosophy of freedom, it is essential that a university community work together to understand context and make choices together to ensure progress. How do all stakeholders within a university support one another in making intelligent choices? What conditions are necessary for this to happen? Without this consideration, we continue to perpetuate an “us vs. them” attitude between faculty and administration that undermines the potential to realize academic freedom within the institution. True freedom (and, by association, academic freedom) according to Dewey requires a deep understanding of laws, policies, and financial/market conditions in order to develop “power of vision and reflection” (p. 287).

Academic freedom rests in the right relationships between faculty and administration. Yes, administrators need to be held accountable when they abuse their power. Judith Butler provides a powerful analysis of this work in her essay for The Chronicle of Higher Education. By the same token, faculty need to be held accountable as well – to ensure that their “freedoms,” as they see them, do not come at the expense of others or the institution. Achieving the kind of academic freedom that aligns with Dewey’s philosophy of freedom will take a great deal of work changing the culture of higher education.